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FOREWORD

War with Iraq will signal the beginning of a new era in
American national security policy and alter strategic
balances and relationships around the world. The specific
effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In
some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it
may degrade without serious and sustained efforts.
To assess this dynamic, the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) has developed a special series of monographs entitled
Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq. In each, the author
has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key
states in their region are taking on U.S. military action
against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war
with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region
after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq
will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
This monograph is one of the special series. SSI is
pleased to offer it to assist the Department of Army and
Department of Defense in crafting the most effective
strategy possible for dealing with the many consequences of
war with Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF CONFLICT
WITH IRAQ: POST-SOVIET STATES

Conclusions:

· A short war with rapid decisive victory minimizes future
risks connected with Iraq to our force stationed in the
former Soviet Union. However, it does not eliminate
existing threats or allow for reduction in force unless we
prosecute the war in Afghanistan much more intensively
and accelerate the rebuilding of that state.
· No feasible scenario allows for immediate reduction of
troops in the Transcaucasus or Central Asia, but many
conceivable scenarios of a war gone wrong in Iraq could
lead to the need to send more forces into these theaters.
An American-led war with Iraq will affect the international state system profoundly, particularly the
potentially volatile set of regions that comprise the Former
Soviet Union (FSU). Because the war with Iraq is not
directly related to prevailing security conditions in the FSU,
we can make the following predictions with reasonable
certainty. Some, if not all, currently existing strategic
factors in the FSU will continue, whether or not the United
States goes to war with Iraq, and whether or not the war is
short or long, conventional or one that witnesses the use of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other forms of
unconventional warfare. They also will require the
continuing presence of U.S. forces at the level of their
current deployments there. While the trigger for more
violence in the FSU is not directly connected to Iraq or the
Gulf, the possibility of serious military repercussions does
exist, but they would have to be triggered initially from
outside and then evoke a major reaction within the FSU.
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The strategic trends that make for volatility within the
FSU are located in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus
where both the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and
U.S. European Command (EUCOM) already have forces
deployed and important U.S. interests are at stake. The war
against Iraq, no matter what its course may be, will not
terminate the war against global terrorism that emanates
at least in part from Central Asia and which has at least
some presence in or around Georgia beyond Tbilisi’s ability
to face that threat. Indeed, the recent discovery of ricin in
Georgia underscores the potential for very serious threats
in this part of the world.1
Neither will the course and outcome of the war with Iraq
immediately resolve the domestic “security deficits” in the
FSU that raise the possibility for violence attendant upon a
war with Iraq. Therefore the war against Iraq will not and
cannot directly enhance the security of either Georgia or
Azerbaijan or allow the United States to remove forces from
those states. The same conclusions apply as well for U.S.
Central Asian deployments. On the other hand, if things go
badly for the United States in Iraq or the war significantly
confounds U.S. plans, the situation could deteriorate quite
visibly and rapidly in the FSU. American forces there may
be called upon to play a role in the war against Iraq should
unforeseen contingencies ensue. While arguably the United
States cannot reduce forces in those theaters, if anything,
and depending on the course and outcome of the war with
Iraq, the United States may have to put in more. This
assessment stems from the following facts:

·
·

The war against global terrorism is by no means over,
nor is any end in sight.
Afghanistan is nowhere close to a level of stability and
security from revived warlordism and terrorist
penetration (perhaps abetted by rogue elements in
Pakistan) that can allow the United States to
withdraw forces from there. And without stability in
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Afghanistan, Central Asia comes under immediate
and direct risk.

·

The “non-terrorist” or indigenous threats to the
security of states in the former Soviet Union will not
have been lessened by the course of war in Iraq. If
anything, a long war or one featuring either WMD or
other forms of unconventional warfare could lead to
more threats against American and allied forces in
those areas. The reasons behind this argument are
given below.

Those regional and adjacent sources of potential violence
in the FSU comprise the following phenomena whose
presence has little or nothing to do with Iraq and even
Al-Qa’ida, but which could be exploited by them or others to
attack U.S. forces, assets, allies, and interests. Those
phenomena are both structural and the result of deliberate
policies by local governments that interact with those
structural characteristics. They comprise:

·
·

Insecure borders and thus ethnic and territorial
conflicts;

·

Great and grinding poverty alongside of spiraling
wealth for a few, and massive official corruption;

·

Very high degrees of environmental degradation
leading to rivalries over water and energy;

·

Ethnic and/or religious tensions that are manipulated
easily by the local authoritarian governments;

·

Repressive authoritarian regimes;
Weak militaries and weak civilian democratic
controls over the means of violence—a factor that
entails weak states, weak governments, and can
easily spawn paramilitary, insurgent, or terrorist
formations;
3

·

·

Enormous state corruption and deeply-rooted
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) whose
main source of profits is the drug trade, but who also
are involved in WMD smuggling across borders. In
addition, many signs, including recent ones, indicate
that the Chechens or other terrorists linked to
Al-Qa’ida are searching for WMD.2

·

Some analysts and commentators believe there are
links between many of these groups to states and
various insurgent and terrorist formations, in
particular but not only to Pakistan’s ISI (InterService Institution) are well-known.

·

The willingness of foreign regimes to subvert local
governments, wage or threaten economic warfare
against them, launch coups, incite terrorism, or
actually threaten or use force against them, and to
threaten the use of force due to rivalries for energy
assets that can become pretexts for violence (e.g., Iran
and Azerbaijan in 2001). Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and
China have engaged in one or more of these behaviors
in the past decade and could do so again.
The belief in Moscow that the United States should
only stay in Central Asia for the duration of
Afghanistan operation. Moreover, China and Iran
have frequently publicly voiced opposition to the U.S.
position in Central Asia and are clearly cooperating
with each other.3

A prolonged war in Iraq plus protracted presence in
Central Asia could lead to a revival of the strong ties
between and/or among Russia, China, and Iran that would
be based on the common aim of forcing the United States out
of the area. Admittedly this is something of a worst case
scenario, but Iran alone or any of the other two could, with
the passive support of the others, undertake such actions.
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One way to do so would be support, both overt and covert, for
attacks upon U.S. Central Asian positions.
These external rivalries in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and around Central Asia are so
intense in some cases that they have spawned classical
alliances for war, e.g., the new Indo-Iranian alliance that
gives India “the right to use Iranian military bases in the
event of a war with neighboring Pakistan, in exchange for
India providing Tehran with military hardware, training,
maintenance, and modernization support.”4 Thus the
possibility of outbreak of conflicts in and around Central
Asia is real and not necessarily tied to conditions in Iraq.
But a war with Iraq could be exploited by third parties to
attack U.S. interests, allies, and assets in the FSU. Indeed,
U.S. naval forces are in Azerbaijan and ground forces in
Georgia precisely to ward off threats from Iran against
Azeri oil and coastal assets, from Russia and/or Chechen
terrorists against Georgia, and to help train and modernize
those states’ armies and navies and to guard Azerbaijan’s
coastal assets.
Possibilities also exist for more cooperative military
relations with other actors who might be willing under
certain circumstances to upgrade their contribution to a
cooperative security regime in these places. NATO and the
European Union have shown a rising interest in the
Caucasus and to a lesser degree Central Asia, especially as
expressed at the November 2002 Prague summit. Those
regions are no longer “out of area,” and both NATO and
Central Asian states seek deeper and broader contacts
among their armed forces.5 Russia has already accepted the
potential benefit of this presence and raised the possibility
for cooperation with NATO in Central Asia.6
On the other hand, Russia’s military is resisting this
cooperation. Complications in Iraq would fortify this
resistance and increase the voice of the obstructionists
within Russian policymaking. Similarly China, alarmed at
NATO’s rising profile in Central Asia, has initiated regular
5

consultations with the Alliance.7 While the possibility for
future conflicts in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus
remains reasonably high, there also are real grounds for
working towards a more cooperative multilateral security
regime in these areas.
Nonetheless, the positive trends are embryonic. If
subjected to strain, they may fall apart. Putin and the
Russian military are striving to create a CIS military
modeled after the Warsaw Pact.8 Such an organization
might liaise with NATO but would preclude effective
bilateral cooperation with the armed forces of member
states. Meanwhile existing rivalries continue and, as in the
Indo-Iranian deal, may be growing. So the United States
cannot assume either a conflict-free environment there or
that the great powers will happily cooperate with each other
in these zones.
Exchanges and exercises involving U.S. troops to help
train local forces to defend against invasion from outside or
from domestic insurgencies are two of the most effective
ways of cementing partnerships.9 It is vital to continue this.
U.S. forces involved in this effort must include a significant
Army presence to train and advise, as well as to help secure
American installations. But a vital issue is the extent to
which U.S. forces will directly or indirectly help protect
friendly regimes. The new Russian deployment at the air
base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, is widely suspected of having a
mission of defense of the government against domestic
unrest, i.e., counterinsurgency or something close to it.10
U.S. allies in Central Asia undoubtedly expect a similar or
analogous response or at least training of their own forces
whose first mission is defense of the regime.
If the war with Iraq drags on or WMD are used, Saddam
Hussein or those sympathetic to him may attempt to open a
second and even third front, much as the terrorists did by
striking at Kashmir in late 2001 to relieve the pressure on
Al-Qa’ida. Except for Chechnya, the regions of the former
Soviet Union have not evinced the rabid anti-Americanism
6

seen elsewhere, but groups inclined this way do exist and
are connected either to Al-Qa’ida or state sponsors—
Chechens to Saudi Arabia, and Hizbollah and other groups
to Iran. Rogue elements within Pakistan probably can
provide significant assistance to them as well. Under such
circumstances, American forces stationed in the FSU could
become targets. Attacks could include terrorism and
guerrilla operations that might threaten the logistical bases
and communications of U.S. and allied forces. Terrorists
and other enemies will believe that an America embroiled in
protracted war in Iraq is weak elsewhere and vulnerable to
attack. This would be true particularly if the conflict with
Iraq leaves the United States diplomatically isolated.
Escalating terrorism against the United States could deter
the FSU states from preserving their partnerships with
Washington. Even in lieu of this, the United States might
have to inject more troops into the theater to counter the
terrorist challenge.
Economic Considerations.
However the war goes, it will have a significant and
discernible impact on the global economy. First, the advent
of war, whether prolonged or rapid, means rising U.S.
Government deficits. Those will force an increase in both
the interest rate here and abroad as well as in domestic
taxes. It will further slow worldwide growth while forcing
global interest rates up and crowding other governments
out of the capital market. Those former Soviet states
without energy resources will be affected adversely by those
trends in the short and middle term. But a prolonged war
means even more distress for them since it will bring about
international energy shortages, heightened fears of even
more shortages, greatly increased prices for energy,
possible boycotts of the United States by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or some of its
members, and thus a chain of events that will worsen
domestic conditions and possibly provoke instability in
their countries.
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Oil producers may, on the other hand, enjoy a windfall
from a long war. Nevertheless, it should be remembered
that, despite being major producers of oil and gas, many of
these states can neither produce nor distribute enough to
meet their own needs and are thus importers who must
compete in the world markets. Kazakstan may be an
exception but not by much. Since they must buy oil and gas
on the markets, their foreign revenues and economies will
not escape the expected impact of this war. Further
economic distress, especially if it is protracted and severe
and part of a larger progression of political and socioeconomic breakdown or anomie, often generates a causal
chain with discernible political outcomes that point toward
enhanced instability or at least the potential for it.
Therefore, a very short or short war followed by rapid
reconstruction of Iraqi energy infrastructures is the only or
most beneficial outcome for these countries from the
standpoint of global economics. Otherwise the economic,
strategic, and political outcomes of the war could easily
interact with their domestic conditions to generate a spiral
of political unrest and possibly violence against the United
States or friendly regimes. Any scenario other than this also
means much greater middle and long-term chances for
unrest and even violence. That violence could threaten U.S.
forces abroad and force the United States to defend what
have become important, and possibly in some places vital,
interests by finding reinforcements who can perform
stabilization and/or counterinsurgency, and counterterrorist missions in the FSU.
Even if the war with Iraq leads to a rapid, decisive
victory, many officials and insiders hold that the United
States will still need to maintain at least the present
number of forces in the former Soviet Union. However,
should events deviate significantly from that scenario, the
United States may have to add to the existing troop levels in
the FSU.
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Russia.
The United States has no troops inside Russia or the
western former Soviet republics like Belarus, Ukraine, and
Moldova, and no plans exist for deploying forces to those
states. Still, different courses and outcomes of a war against
Iraq could substantially affect Russia’s calculus to support
or withhold support from other FSU nations and thus oblige
the United States to redeploy forces.
Specifically, if the war appears to threaten important or
vital Russian interests, Moscow might consider providing
intelligence support or other forms of assistance to
America’s enemies. The United States would then
encounter even more adamant political and diplomatic
resistance to any unilateral action it might take. Moscow’s
continuing (and, in its own mind, principled) support for the
United Nations (U.N.), which is designed to restrict
American use of force, would increase. Moscow would then
use its membership in the Security Council to support
hostile forces and obstruct the unhampered use of American
power. If that worked, Moscow might modulate its
opposition and refrain from supporting enemies of the
United States.
Assessing Moscow’s likely response to a U.S. war with
Iraq requires an understanding of Russian national
interests. These include:

·
·

Accessing the Iraqi energy market, and recovering
debts.
Developing and sustaining a balanced partnership
with the United States. For Russia, this partnership
entails regular joint consultation, compromises that
meet both sides’ interests, and a balanced relationship, not a surrender of Moscow’s standpoint to Washington’s.11
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·
·

Constraining the use of force by the United States and
NATO, preferably via the U.N.12

·

Restoring influence in the Middle East. As the
enjoyment of such a role in the Soviet era also entailed
a large volume of arms sales, and proliferation to Iran
is continuing and may be resumed with Syria, this
possibility should not be overlooked in U.S. calculations.
Protecting the partnership with Iran. Moscow and
surely some in Tehran might fear that a successful
and especially a fast campaign against Iraq could
embolden Washington to start putting political
pressure on Iran. The United States also could apply
much more pressure on Russia to abandon Iran,
which it considers, not without reservations (mainly
about Tehran’s ambitions in the Caspian Sea), an ally.

Russia’s economic interests point in many directions at
the same time. First, as virtually all official pronouncements state, the purpose of foreign policy is to create
conditions that are auspicious for the reconstruction of
Russia’s economy.13 Moreover, the oil and gas sector is
crucial, providing almost 40 percent of Russia’s hardcurrency earnings and most of the foreign trade surplus.
This makes members of the energy lobby, who do not have
uniform interests all the time, the most powerful and
important lobby in Russian politics, domestic or foreign.
Regarding Iraq, Moscow certainly wants to recover the $7
billion owed to it by Baghdad and claims to have lost $30
billion there since 1990. But equally importantly, its oil
firms see the potential to earn billions more in revenues if
they can work in unhampered fashion in Iraq.14
Russian observers fully understand that, despite the
lucrative profits Russian firms have made by circumventing
the U.N. embargos, if Iraq remains under Saddam
Hussein’s control, this debt is probably unrecoverable.
Moreover, a Russia that is too close to him will not enjoy
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much popularity with a successor regime preoccupied with
rebuilding Iraq and beholden to the United States. So
unless Moscow can dance at two weddings at the same time
and convince Iraq and Saddam’s rivals that it is defending
their interests, recovery of this debt (much of it owed to
energy companies) is a hopeless quest. At the same time,
Moscow and its oilmen are exquisitely sensitive to the
possibilities offered them by the American market.
In the event of a short, victorious war, the United States
will have leverage over reconstruction of the Iraqi energy
industry and thus hold a major card in determining global
output and price levels. Moreover, reconstruction of the
Iraqi system would then be a less costly and more rapid
affair. The United States and the new Iraqi regime could
then bring more oil online quickly, pushing down global
petroleum prices. This would increase U.S. leverage over
Russia which could, in turn, be used to prevent Moscow from
balancing or constraining American actions. The United
States also could use market access and investment so that
Russian energy receipts are not affected adversely (and
along with them the entire economy of Russia). The United
States would also then be able to encourage and regulate the
degree to which Russian oil firms participate in Iraq’s
reconstruction and perhaps devise creative ways for
Moscow to recover the Iraqi debts.
As it is, the United States has encouraged Russian firms
to support the Iraqi dissidents, painting this as a way to
recover debts and enjoy good relations with America.15 This
temporarily cost them access in Saddam’s Iraq.16 In a short,
victorious, and purely conventional war where the political
heat upon America is minimal, those industries would lobby
for support for America in order to get in on postwar
reconstruction contracts, recovery of debts, new markets to
the West (including the United States), and investment in
their infrastructure.
However, a long war, especially one that generates
intense hostility in Europe, Russia, and in Islamic
11

communities, will affect the economics of the situation. It
will raise the costs of reconstructing Iraq afterwards,
thereby delaying its return to the market, create probable
shortages or sharp price rises, and create immense domestic
pressures upon the government in Moscow to oppose
Washington regardless of the energy lobby’s interests. The
anti-American elites would be strengthened.
Although it does not always acquiesce to American
policy and Washington’s demands, Russia has served as
America’s strategic partner since September 11. This has
led to expanded American military access to the FSU and
Afghanistan, with Moscow’s support, intelligence sharing,
and a diminution of opposition to NATO’s expansion and to
withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty.
This policy is known to be highly unpopular among military
and foreign policy elites. They have constantly sought to
erode, undermine, limit, and obstruct it. The worse the war
with Iraq goes, in other words, the greater the pressure on
the Russian government to support America’s enemies,
whether covertly or overtly.
Russia itself might become a second front for the
terrorists using assets in Chechnya or elsewhere. The
recent discovery of ricin in Georgia underscores the
possibility for chemical or biological attacks either in the
former Soviet republics or in Russia itself. It is all too
possible that Al-Qa’ida, the Chechens, or other associated
parties might attack Russia to force it to abandon Washington. As the United States cannot predict the nature and
scope of such attacks, it cannot predict their effects. But this
possibility must not be neglected in any assessment of
wartime or postwar contingencies.
A cardinal point of this partnership and of Russian
foreign policy in general is opposition to any use of American
forces (other than self-defense) outside of the U.N. Russia
will not accord the U.N. a role in Chechnya, but it has
steadfastly maintained that the United States cannot use
force in Iraq or elsewhere under any auspices other than
12

that of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). Its intention is to
obtain, thereby, a veto over U.S. defense policy. Accordingly,
any military action against Iraq that is not sanctioned by
the UNSC will cause an enormous spike in Russian political
opposition. Elements within the Russian elite could solicit
and perhaps even obtain support for actions explicitly
intended to prevent the United States from attaining its
objectives in Iraq and in the war on terrorism. Again a short,
conventional war will curtail that explosion although the
resentment will last. But if a long war or the use of WMD
takes place, and even more if the ensuing likely “second
front” is one where Moscow perceives its vital interests to be
engaged, the United States then runs the risk of rupturing
the coalition with Russia. Russian spokesmen have
repeatedly warned that this would happen if we went to war
unless the UNSC sanctioned it.17 Indeed, according to their
General Staff, they were trying to organize a military coup
against Saddam to avert a war and thus exclude the United
States from Iraq.18
If the war with Iraq goes badly, especially if Russia’s
vital interests are threatened, one result would be
opposition to U.S. presence in Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus along with an upsurge of gun running and
intelligence cooperation with various anti-American forces
in the area, including even some of the anti-regime elements
in Central Asia or Afghanistan. Certainly, in the past,
Russian intelligence agencies have had some rather
interesting relationships with many of these groups and the
use of such groups has been a centuries old tactic of Russian
policy.19 The war with Iraq may not lead to direct Russian
military threats against U.S. forces in neighboring states,
but may spark indirect opposition, particularly support for
anti-American movements in Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus.
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Concluding Remarks.
The upshot of the previous analysis is that a fast,
decisive, exclusively conventional war followed by a
successful and rapid reconstruction of Iraq’s overall
economy and polity will allow the United States to minimize
the risks and costs associated with the possible rise of a
“second front,” presumably terrorist attacks on American
and/or allied assets, forces, or interests. The United States
probably cannot escape some of these attacks, but victory of
this kind can reduce the cost and allow the United States to
maintain other troop deployments in the FSU and
elsewhere at current levels. Conversely a long, unconventional, and/or highly destructive war magnifies the costs
and risks the United States runs not only in Iraq but in
other “theaters,” including the FSU, and could easily oblige
the United States to send more troops. The United States
need not undergo the full range of those contingencies for
this conclusion to hold. Any one of the three conditions of
prolonged or highly destructive war could require greater
force deployments. Many of those forces, given the nature of
U.S. vulnerabilities, assets, and threats to them in those
theaters, would necessarily be ground forces.
Regardless of how the United States wages war with
Iraq, the war on terrorism is not and will not end soon.
Hence opportunities and incentives for striking at U.S.
interests will not immediately decline subsequent to victory
over Iraq. But they may well increase if the war does not
follow the “rosy scenario” offered by many. War with Iraq
will almost certainly intensify the terrorists’ desire to strike
at American interests and targets. A short, decisive war,
followed by Iraqi public rejoicing at liberation, will give
some people second thoughts about doing so. But a long,
unconventional, and highly destructive war will only
confirm existing predispositions and encourage others who
might have been dissuaded by the more optimistic scenario
to join in that cause.
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Recommendations.

·
·

Saturate Iraq with forces to achieve rapid, decisive,
overwhelming victory and then rapidly scale back to
involve allies in subsequent peace operations.

·

Intensify and accelerate peacebuilding operations
and the war in Afghanistan.
Intensify and deepen bilateral and multilateral forms
of military cooperation with former Soviet states.
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